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Abstract
Why are acts of organized resistance associated with coups? Inspired by the Arab Spring,
a large literature suggests that militaries confronted with civil resistance tend to side with
protesters and oust their government. In the historically most coup-prone environment
of insurgencies, however, alliances between the military and protesters are implausible
because soldiers suspect insurgents behind social dissent. Disentangling different types of
resistance, this article analyzes whether and how strikes, demonstrations, riots, and
guerrilla attacks affect the military’s disposition and ability to stage a coup during
counterinsurgencies. We argue that only strikes trigger coup attempts. Soldiers inter-
pret strikes as manifestations of a strengthening subversive enemy that threatens their
victory over insurgents, while economic elites support a coup in the hope that the military
will terminate costly walkouts. This interest alignment fosters military takeovers. We
provide case-study evidence from Cold War Argentina and Venezuela to show our sug-
gested mechanism at work. Demonstrating the scope of our argument, we quantitatively
analyze coup attempts in counterinsurgency worldwide (1950–2005). Results show that
strikes increase wartime coup risk, whereas demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla attacks do
not. The findings highlight the backfiring potential of nonviolent resistance with important
implications for post-coup political orders and democratization prospects.
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Why are acts of organized resistance associated with military coups? Soldiers are known
to overthrow their government if they see the need to do so and believe that their putsch
will be successful (e.g. Finer, 1988; Powell, 2012; Thyne, 2010). This article examines
how civil dissent influences the military’s disposition and ability for a coup. Regarding
soldiers’ coup disposition, the Arab Spring created the expectation that militaries con-
fronted with peaceful demonstrations oust their repressive governments in solidarity
with the people in the streets (e.g. Barany, 2016; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; Johnson
and Thyne, 2018; Nepstad, 2011). In many political settings, however, alliances between
protesters and the military are implausible (Holmes and Koehler, 2020; O’Donnell,
1988). In the historically most coup-prone environment of insurgencies,1 soldiers
commonly perceive nonviolent resistance as the work of subversive foes (Kitson, 1971;
O’Donnell, 1986; Thompson, 1966). Officers are afraid that the enemy is gaining crucial
support among the population, which threatens the military organization and the entire
country. Faced with popular dissent, soldiers therefore take over power not in support of
protesters but to halt the subversive threat.
Another common expectation is that all forms of public resistance against the state
bolster the military’s ability to successfully stage a coup (e.g. Casper and Tyson, 2014;
Powell, 2012; Wig and Rød, 2016). Protests are said to generally open a window of
opportunity for security forces to coordinate a putsch. However, it remains unclear when
coup plotters exactly see an opportunity to successfully overthrow the government. For
armed forces involved in a counterinsurgency, for example, the stakes of a coup attempt
could hardly be higher. A successful takeover allows soldiers to streamline political
decisions and quell the uprising (Thyne, 2017), whereas a coup failure weakens the state,
reduces the chances of military victory, and threatens the survival of the military
organization. For this reason, coup plotters may worry about potentially opposing fac-
tions within the armed forces and are likely to seek the support of influential allies that
allow for the smooth seizure of power.
In this article, we analyze the impact of different resistance types on elite interests in
the military and the economic sector.2 We argue that only strikes provide military coup
plotters with a powerful ally outside the armed forces. Walkouts impose severe costs on
economic elites, which motivates them to turn away from the government and support
soldiers in taking over power (O’Donnell, 1973, 1988). Our theory therefore explains the
relationship between strikes and coups not through a collaboration between the masses
and the military, but through a pact between officers and economic elites that is directed
against both the government and the protesters in the streets.
We empirically test our argument using a nested triangulation design, which com-
bines qualitative and quantitative evidence from different levels of analysis (Lieberman,
2005). The qualitative case studies allow us to show the plausibility of our theoretical
mechanism. Since coordination between conspiratorial elites is inevitably difficult to
observe and quantify, we detail how strikes motivated the close collaboration between
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Argentine military and business elites in the run-up to the 1976 coup against the
Martı́nez de Perón government. Conversely, we demonstrate how the inability of
Venezuelan insurgents to mobilize the working class in the mid-1960s prevented eco-
nomic elites from supporting the military to take over power. In result, Venezuelan
officers refrained from staging a coup during the counterinsurgency despite significant
levels of protest. In support of our theoretical argument, the qualitative comparison of
two similar cases illustrates the preconditions, developments, and importance of coor-
dination processes between military and economic elites for the occurrence of coups.
To demonstrate the scope of our argument, we conduct quantitative analyses using
global data on events of organized resistance and coups across all counterinsurgencies
between 1950 and 2005. Deviating from previous studies that use aggregate measures of
public dissent (e.g. Casper and Tyson, 2014; Thyne, 2010; Wig and Rød, 2016),3 we
distinguish the four main types of domestic resistance—strikes, demonstrations, riots,
and guerrilla attacks. In line with our hypotheses, the results from our quantitative
analyses show that only strikes increase the likelihood of coups during counter-
insurgencies, whereas other forms of resistance do not.
This article contributes to our understanding of military takeovers by bringing
together insights from research on civil resistance, insurgencies, and military coups.
Recent studies suggest that military takeovers are especially likely in times of social
unrest (Bell and Sudduth, 2017; Casper and Tyson, 2014; Johnson and Thyne, 2018;
Thyne, 2010; Wig and Rød, 2016). We advance existing research in five ways. First, we
analytically distinguish between resistance types to show that they do not uniformly
influence the military’s decision to stage a coup. Second, we uncover the pathways
through which different dissent types affect military interests. Third, we show that
violent resistance such as guerrilla or terror attacks have little influence on the military’s
coup motivation if soldiers perceive them as desperate acts of a weakened enemy.
Fourth, we demonstrate the importance of elites outside the armed forces in the initiation
of a coup. Finally, we clarify how the political environment of counterinsurgency gives
rise to coup coalitions with adverse prospects for democratization. In this context, only
strikes both motivate soldiers for a coup and generate the vital support of economic
elites.
Research on civil-military relations and coups
We next outline the analytical framework commonly used to explain military coups and
discuss how social unrest affects military decision-making. Scholars widely agree that
the likelihood of coup attempts increases with soldiers’ disposition and ability to stage a
takeover (Feaver, 1999; Finer, 1988; Johnson and Thyne, 2018). Disposition refers to the
soldiers’ evaluation to what extent a successful coup would improve their current situ-
ation (Powell, 2012: 1021–1022). The more the military or individual factions feel
aggrieved by the government, the higher the likelihood for coups (Finer, 1988; Hun-
tington, 1985; Thompson, 1973). Soldiers have staged coups for personal reasons such as
private political convictions or unfulfilled career ambitions, but “the defense or
enhancement of the military’s corporate interests is easily the most important inter-
ventionist motive” (Nordlinger, 1977: 65).4
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Research suggests that soldiers particularly fear for the military’s corporate interests
when they are confronted with peaceful protests (Barany, 2016). If governments order
harsh repression to quell nonviolent resistance, officers and the rank and file carefully
consider the risks of internal divisions, reputational damage, and international reper-
cussions (DeMeritt, 2015: 432–434; Janowitz, 1988: 113). Knowing that foot soldiers
lack the appropriate training and equipment to police peaceful crowds, while some
recruits may even sympathize with the protesters, officers have to worry that their
subordinates will shirk orders or even defect (Albrecht and Ohl, 2016; Nassif, 2015;
Pion-Berlin et al., 2014). In the extreme case, this may corrupt the integrity of the entire
organization (Geddes, 2004).5 To avoid these risks, studies argue that militaries are
likely to side with the protesters and oust their government (e.g. Chenoweth and Stephan,
2011; Johnson and Thyne, 2018).
However, other than, for example, in Egypt during the Arab Spring, there are contexts
where military alignments with the protesters are highly unlikely. This is particularly the
case during counterinsurgencies, where soldiers often perceive protesters as the extended
arm of the insurgent enemy, which aims at replacing the state and its armed forces by a
revolutionary regime (Kitson, 1971; O’Donnell, 1986; Thompson, 1966). The suspected
link between rebels and protesters should minimize the military’s willingness to back the
people in the streets. While this does not exclude defections by individual soldiers, it
reduces the possibility that entire units or factions of the military join the resistance
movement.
Beyond disposition, scholars note that soldiers need to have the ability to stage a coup
(Powell, 2012). Ability refers to the chances that the attempted takeover will success-
fully remove the sitting government and that no counter-coup will reverse the newly
installed leadership. If coup attempts fail, like in 2016 in Turkey, the instigators and their
accomplices usually face draconian penalties and widespread persecution. Coup plotters
need to maximize support and legitimacy in secrecy before attempting a revolt (Luttwak,
2016; Singh, 2014). The ability of coup plotters therefore depends on the possibilities to
infer the preferences of potential fellow conspirators or supporters, and the capacity to
coordinate among those involved without being exposed beforehand (Powell, 2012). The
higher the soldiers’ ability to coordinate and sustain a political takeover, the more likely
they are to overthrow the government (Casper and Tyson, 2014; Singh, 2014). For this
reason, leaders often structurally reduce the military’s ability to organize coups (Tal-
madge, 2015). Governments may set up parallel organizations that constantly check on
each other or break personal ties between soldiers to minimize their ability to revolt (e.g.
Böhmelt and Pilster, 2015; De Bruin, 2018; Quinlivan, 1999).
Institutional safeguards, however, cannot provide absolute security from coups. The
literature has identified so-called windows of opportunity such as anti-government
protests, where soldiers are said to have an exceptionally high coup ability (Thyne,
2010). According to Casper and Tyson (2014: 555–557), for example, protests inform
elites about the preferences of the population, the evident vulnerability of the govern-
ment, and the resulting incentives of other elites to abandon it. Public resistance against
the state is therefore supposed to trigger a bandwagon effect with elite members
defecting from the government in order to not end up on the losing side (Bell and
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Sudduth, 2017; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). As such, all protests would serve as cues
that facilitate coordination among elites and thus increase the risk of a coup.
Notwithstanding their high analytical value for analyzing military takeover,
explanations of elite coordination remain largely abstract. It is unclear how elites
perceive different types of resistance and how these influence their subsequent
behavior. In his seminal study of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, O’Donnell (1988:
24–27) argues that powerful elites evaluate domestic resistance in light of the larger
political instability. Elites are likely to conspire against the government if they believe
that a particular form of resistance is the first sign of a coming revolution, which may
deprive them of their hegemony over the populace (O’Donnell, 1988: 28–30). To
secure their political and economic supremacy, elites have a strong incentive to
establish a new regime that is uncompromising toward protest movements and
insurgent groups (O’Donnell, 1988: 31–33).
We build on the argument that the reaction to different forms of resistance depends on
the perception and behavior of elites (O’Donnell, 1973, 1988). However, our explanation
sheds light on the dynamic coordination between the military and economic elites in the
run-up to a coup. We detail how both actors perceive different resistance types and how
this influences their subsequent behavior during insurgencies. Since different forms of
organized dissent impose distinct costs, we delineate the interests of military and eco-
nomic actors to explain when and how they conspire against the government.
Resistance types and coups in counterinsurgencies
In this section, we introduce the context of insurgencies and its impact on the perception
of public resistance among military and economic elites,6 before explaining why strikes
trigger coups while demonstrations and violent attacks do not. Figure 1 depicts the
analytical dimensions and pathways of our argument. By taking into account the central
role of the military for staging coups, we classify how different types of organized
resistance influence both the soldiers’ disposition and ability to oust the government.7
Informed by counterinsurgency literature, we argue that significant parts of the armed
forces see nonviolent forms of dissent as evidence of a subversive enemy gaining
popular support, whereas violent resistance like guerrilla attacks or riots indicate a
weakened insurgent enemy (Kilcullen, 2010: 45; Thompson, 1966: 84–111). Confronted
with strikes or demonstrations, we expect some soldiers to develop the radical conviction
that the incumbent government needs to be replaced as it is incapable of containing the
insurgency (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán, 2013: 14–15; Stepan, 1986: 136–138).
However, soldiers with a coup disposition only attempt to overthrow the government if
they believe that they have the ability to do so. Given the heterogeneity of beliefs within
the military, coup plotters fundamentally concerned about the subversive threat antici-
pate that other officers may not share their views and even oppose their coup plans
(Albrecht, 2019: 310–316; Scharpf, 2018: 208–209). Conspirators therefore have an
incentive to collude with a powerful ally outside the military apparatus to increase the
chances of a successful takeover (Aksoy et al., 2015).
We argue that strikes increase coup ability by triggering support from economic
elites. Even though business owners worry less about political subversion, entrepreneurs,
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managers, and investors fear that labor-based dissent may have unpredictable, long-term
consequences on the economy with detrimental consequences for their profits
(O’Donnell, 1988: 15–22). In the worst case, frequent work stoppages and costly con-
cessions to workers cause economic losses that are severe enough to destabilize entire
economic sectors. Faced with strikes, economic elites should thus be sympathetic to
actors that are uncompromising toward workers’ demands (O’Donnell, 1988: 25). As we
explain next, during insurgencies they are likely to find allies within the military that are
also fundamentally concerned about walkouts.
The context of counterinsurgency and subversion
Insurgencies are asymmetric conflicts between militarily inferior rebels and a com-
paratively strong state (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010). Because of the uneven combat
power, insurgents avoid pitched battles but rely on sporadic hit-and-run attacks to wear
down the state in a protracted armed struggle (Kalyvas, 2005; Lyall, 2010). To win the
victory over the state and achieve their political goals, insurgent groups must gain the
support of the wider population (Johnson, 1962; Valentino et al., 2004). Civilian support


























Figure 1. Theoretical mechanism.
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and exploit the momentum of surprise (Valentino et al., 2004). More importantly, rebels
need civilian backing to acquire resources, attract recruits, and gain legitimacy (Paret,
1964; Thompson, 1966). Only then can insurgent groups overcome their military
inferiority and be successful.
To win the vital support from the population, rebels extensively use propaganda.
Insurgents try to persuade civilians of the government’s responsibility for all wrongs and
injustices while they claim to fight in the name of the people (Paret, 1964: 12). Activities
of ideological indoctrination thereby often aim at dissatisfied students, workers, or
peasants. These efforts are commonly summarized as “subversive” (Rosenau, 2007: 4–
8). Subversion comprises all activities “short of the use of force, designed to weaken the
military, economic or political strength of a nation by undermining the morale, loyalty or
reliability of its [citizens]” (British Army, 2007: xii). Insurgents draw on subversive
tactics to erode the foundations of the state, mobilize the civilian population for the own
cause, and achieve their goals through broad popular backing (Nkrumah, 1968: 98–99).
The rebels’ use of subversion in domestic conflicts has a profound impact on the
soldiers’ mindset and tasks. Counterinsurgency experts agree that approaches that are
primarily concerned with solving acute security problems with military force inevitably
remain piecemeal, as it does not address the underlying problem (e.g. Kitson, 1971;
Paret, 1964; Trinquier, 1964). A comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy must tackle
the ideological roots of the rebellion: “the main emphasis should be given to defeating
subversion, not the guerrillas” (Thompson, 1966: 111). As a consequence, the military
often assumes a greater role in political decision-making and takes over genuinely
civilian tasks in order to prevent the subversive ideas from infecting the minds of the
larger population (Huntington, 1962: 19–22).8 For example, in the hope of countering the
insurgent propaganda, soldiers provide public services to alleviate civilian grievances
(Stepan, 1986). The military’s meddling in political affairs and its regular interaction
with the larger population hereby often politicizes otherwise politically sterile military
organizations (Elkin and Ritezel, 1985; Horowitz 1980).
The impression of an ongoing subversion convinces politicized soldiers that the
military faces existential threats in the event of defeat.9 Victorious rebels typically
dismantle the military apparatus by imposing far-reaching security sector reforms
(Lyons, 2016; White, 2020). This may include the replacement of the old military
leadership by former rebel commanders, the creation of a new rebel-led security orga-
nization with or without an integration of the traditional army, as well as mass purges in
the officer corps. The threat of a successful subversive enemy for the integrity of the
military makes soldiers highly sensitive toward suspicious civilian behavior and non-
violent dissent.
Why nonviolent resistance increases coup disposition
Based on counterinsurgency training and the priming on subversive threats, soldiers
begin to see society and all civilian behavior through the lens of subversion (Kitson,
1971). Officers commonly suspect insurgents behind social unrest—whether this sus-
picion is justified or not (O’Donnell, 1986: 104–105). Military doctrines and training
manuals highlight strikes and demonstrations as serious indicators of an advancing
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insurgent enemy (Haugaard, 1997). From the perspective of soldiers, the occurrence of
nonviolent resistance is alarming. It indicates that the opponent’s subversive strategy
works and that the enemy has won substantial popular legitimacy, increasing the
insurgent’s chances of victory (Kitson, 1971).
Whether armed insurgents are actually behind individual events of civil resistance is
hard to tell but also largely irrelevant for its impact on soldiers. The mere possibility of
insurgent agency is often sufficient to trigger fears of facing a subverted population. In
fact, various strategists of guerrilla warfare have explicitly stressed the importance of
nonviolent resistance in support of the armed struggle. Both Mao Tse-tung (Marks, 2003:
101–102) and Régis Debray (2017: 46) advised fighters to infiltrate civilian organiza-
tions, encourage civil resistance, and initiate “union struggles.” Similar thoughts can be
found in manuals of urban insurgency, praising demonstrations and strikes as indis-
pensable tools to disrupt the social and economic foundations of the state (Marighella,
2011: 49, 61–64).
From the perspective of soldiers, it therefore appears crucial to end nonviolent
resistance before it creates revolutionary momentum (Paret, 1964). Peaceful dissent
signals legitimate opposition against the state, which may attract domestic or foreign
support for the enemy and severely reduces the military’s prospects for victory (Che-
noweth and Stephan, 2011). In these situations, soldiers are likely to see the government
as a risk factor, which, “through its passivity, lack of authority and inefficiency,”
obstructs necessary steps in fighting back the subversive enemy (O’Donnell, 1988: 49).
Moreover, officers often believe “that their capabilities are superior to those of the civil
sectors, and that these capabilities are sufficient to solve a wide range of social
problems” (O’Donnell, 1986: 105). Such conceptions, for example, shaped military
thinking in Latin America. In the wake of nonviolent opposition, which these officers
saw as a manifestation of a large-scale communist subversion, they concluded that a
putsch would be the best way to restore law and order, streamline politics according to
the demands of counterinsurgency, and protect both the nation and themselves from
greater harm.
Moreover, governments often unwittingly corroborate the soldiers’ conviction that
taking over power is necessary (Wig and Rød, 2016). When faced with waning popular
support and public display of nonviolent discontent, governments are likely to opt for
concessions in order to stay in office (Leventoglu and Metternich, 2018; O’Donnell,
1988). From the soldier’s perspective, however, giving in to the demands of protesters
would further strengthen the rebels at the cost of state and military (White, 2020). For
example, in 1961, French generals attempted to oust President de Gaulle because they
felt that his negotiations with the Algerian insurgents was a contempt for their past
sacrifices and a capitulation to the enemy (Ambler: 1966: 257–260).10 Soldiers tend to
perceive reconciliatory steps by the government as betrayal of their war efforts, which
motivates them to revolt (White, 2020).
In sum, soldiers, who are confronted with a subversive enemy, are likely to interpret
peaceful resistance as a threat to their military victory over the rebels, which increases
their disposition for a coup. We now further disaggregate nonviolent resistance to assess
whether strikes and demonstrations influence the soldiers’ ability to replace the
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government during insurgencies. In particular, we analyze how these resistance types
facilitate the coordination among potential allies.
Why strikes increase coup ability but demonstrations do not
As outlined above, internal security threats significantly change civil-military relations
(Desch, 2008; Stepan, 1986). Governments depend on military expertise and resources
which is why they include officers in the executive decision-making (Bove et al., 2020:
268–269). Officers commonly serve as advisers to governments, occupying posts in
ministries and agencies. Moreover, during insurgencies, soldiers typically perform
genuine civilian tasks of the state bureaucracy by organizing essential services such as
electricity, telecommunication, water, and food supply (Elkin and Ritezel, 1985: 494).
This makes the military a central representative of the state, responsible for public
security and economic well-being.
In their role as a public service provider, officers become important contact persons
for the economy. To maintain the day-to-day business and minimize adverse effects of
security operations, officers regularly meet and communicate with business represen-
tatives (Muleiro, 2011). In this context of repeated consultations, members of the mil-
itary and the economic sector exchange views, establish personal relationships, and build
mutual trust. These interactions allow military and economic elites to recognize and
communicate common problems and interests in a trustful atmosphere (Casper and
Tyson, 2014). If both sides believe that the government is incapable of protecting their
core interests, they are likely to plot against the government.
While officers are highly alarmed by any form of nonviolent resistance during
insurgencies, only strikes are likely to motivate economic elites for a military takeover.
Compared to demonstrations, strikes are highly resilient and impose extensive direct
costs on businesses (Butcher et al., 2018; Dinardo and Hallock, 2002). Labor unions
offer established institutions with supraregional structures and strong ties at the local
level. Relying on such densely knit, well-coordinated networks, strikers can maintain
work stoppages and withstand state repression for extensive periods of time (Butcher
et al., 2018; Butcher and Svensson, 2016; Schock, 2005). In contrast, demonstrations
often lack comparable levels of organization, which makes it more difficult for protesters
to maintain cohesion and endure repression (Carey, 2010: 172). Moreover, the capacity
of anti-government protesters to inflict direct economic costs on entrepreneurs and
business owners is often limited. Demonstrations usually feature a high share of dis-
sidents and students who do not play a crucial role in the firms’ production processes
(Karklins and Petersen, 1993: 594). It is therefore particularly labor-based dissent that
threatens the vested interests of business owners and investors.
In view of the great leverage and resilience of strikers, civilian governments might opt
for reconciliatory approaches to please workers (Leventoglu and Metternich, 2018;
O’Donnell, 1988). Business elites anticipate that this would decrease their profits and
strengthen the position of workers in future bargaining. Investors and entrepreneurs
therefore seek a government that is determined to end labor-based dissent without giving
in to the strikers’ demands. The regular exchange between soldiers and economic elites
during insurgencies offers a forum to discuss plans on how to end workers’ resistance,
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eliminate the underlying causes of dissent, and secure the country’s long-term economic
stability.
Faced with strikes, both military and economic elites are likely to conclude that a
military takeover will be mutually beneficial.11 Historically, well-connected business
elites have frequently profited from military coups (Dube et al., 2011). Hugo Banzer’s
military regime in Bolivia, for example, quickly dissolved trade unions and implemented
free-market reforms that unequivocally benefited business owners. In Chile, General
Pinochet pursued a purely neo-liberal agenda that “led to sharp reductions in labor costs
and higher profits for owners” (Pion-Berlin, 1986: 317). Once in power, pacts between
military and economic elites may foster bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, which seek
to stabilize the economy through business-friendly policies and systematic repression of
organized labor (O’Donnell, 1988: 31–32). In the hopes that a military government will
restore order and profitable economic conditions, business elites are likely to defect from
the current regime.
From the perspective of soldiers, coup support from business owners and investors is
crucial to permanently pacify society and protect the nation from future threats. Such
support may comprise access to intelligence, infrastructure, and resources critical to the
counterinsurgency campaign. With powerful economic allies at their side, officers can
expect to hold on to power long enough to implement comprehensive security measures
(Geddes et al., 2014: 151). This includes rooting out insurgents in the jungles or
mountains as much as eradicating subversives from the civilian administration, uni-
versities, unions, and companies. In sum, strikes are likely to trigger coup attempts
during counterinsurgencies, as coup plotters in the military may coordinate the takeover
with strategically important economic elites who are equally determined to end the
dissent.
H1: In counterinsurgencies, strikes increase the risk of military coup attempts.
H2: In counterinsurgencies, demonstrations do not increase the risk of military
coup attempts.
Why violent resistance does not motivate coups
Acts of violent resistance, by contrast, are unlikely to raise soldiers’ concerns about
military victory and should thus not motivate coups during insurgent uprisings.
Counterinsurgency experts agree that an increase in violent attacks indicates that the
military campaign is effective and the enemy is losing ground (Johnson, 1962: 652;
Kilcullen, 2010: 45). Research shows that guerrillas typically react to waning civilian
support or battle losses with an increase in violence to obscure their own weakness and
demonstrate the government’s inability to protect its citizens (Hultman, 2007: 209–
210). While this strategy may have an intimidating effect on civilians, it is unlikely to
impress military officers.
Violent insurgent attacks also do not touch upon other military corporate interests.
Soldiers are trained and equipped to fight armed enemies; this is the military’s area of
expertise, which explains why Burmese officers felt relieved when, in the 1980s, pre-
viously protesting “students fled the cities to join the armed insurgents in the jungles,
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where the comparative advantage of the state was much greater” (Schock, 2005: 158).
Further, soldiers are little concerned about the risks of defections, budgetary cuts, or
political opposition for carrying out heavy-handed operations in response to violent
resistance (Schock, 2005). To defeat violent insurgents, governments often grant the
security forces far-reaching powers and resources (Acemoglu et al., 2010; Bove et al.,
2020). Faced with terrorist attacks or riots, governments and soldiers agree on the
necessity to answer violence with force, and military units do not have to fear reputation
damage, as harsh responses to violent dissent are easy to justify and legitimize (Kalyvas,
2005: 100–101; Schock, 2005: 161). Guerrilla attacks and riots should therefore not
motivate military coups during insurgencies.
H3: In counterinsurgencies, guerrilla attacks and riots do not increase the risk of
military coup attempts.
Qualitative analysis
We test our argument with a triangulation design that nests a qualitative in a larger quan-
titative analysis. Before we turn to the macro-quantitative analysis demonstrating the scope
of our argument, we probe the plausibility of our suggested mechanism with two case
studies. The “model-testing small-n analysis” allows us to scrutinize the perceptions,
interests, and behaviors of key actors (Lieberman, 2005: 440–443). Hereby, we can identify
the collusion dynamics between military and economic elites before a coup, which are
difficult to capture otherwise. Contrasting organized resistance during the insurgencies in
1970s Argentina and 1960s Venezuela, we trace back how strikes stirred fears of subversion
among officers and generated support from business elites for taking over power.
Following Lieberman (2005: 444) and Przeworski and Teune (1970: 32–39), we select
the two qualitative cases for their similar contexts. Besides a common cultural, religious,
and colonial background, as well as the shared language and geographic region, both states
were confronted with multiple communist insurgent groups fighting in urban and rural
areas. Both countries had experienced several military coups and had only recently
returned to democratic rule through popular uprisings (Burggraaff, 1972: 125–129; Heinz,
1999: 615–616). The military in both cases suffered from internal divisions that occa-
sionally erupted in mutinies and even armed infightings (Andersen, 1993: 45–47; Trin-
kunas, 2000: 87–95). Finally, both Argentinean and Venezuelan officers had a similar
perception of subversive struggles based on years of foreign training (Burggraaff, 1972:
47; Pion-Berlin and Lopez, 1991: 69–71). The cases did, however, differ in both the mode
of civil resistance and the outcome. Nationwide strikes in Argentina motivated soldiers to
stage a coup with the active support of economic elites. By contrast, the Venezuelan
insurgents could not incite labor resistance and there was no elite support for military
intervention preventing soldiers from plotting against their government.
Argentina
Since the early 1970s, Argentina had faced violent attacks by two insurgent groups.
Marxist insurgents of the People’s Revolutionary Army and the left-Peronist Montoneros
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relied on hit-and-run attacks, bombings, assassinations, and kidnappings to interrupt all
political and economic life (Heinz, 1999: 621–633). In early 1975, President Isabel
Martı́nez de Perón granted the military far-reaching powers to eliminate the insurgents
and their support networks (Scharpf, 2018: 209–211). What started as a military oper-
ation in the rural province of Tucumán soon turned into a nationwide military campaign
to uproot any subversive tendencies (Heinz, 1999: 684; Lewis, 2002: 105–113).
At the same time, since 1975, general strikes and student protests in urban centers
disrupted public life throughout the country (Lewis, 2002: 100–102). These develop-
ments strongly influenced many officers’ stance toward the government and their
assessment of the insurgent threat, which later motivated the military leadership to take
over power. On the one hand, the worsening economic situation, driven by ill policies
and galloping inflation, showcased the government’s incapacity to provide political
stability (Heinz, 1999: 637). On the other hand, the publicly voiced dissent in the streets
and factories alarmed soldiers about the potential magnitude of subversion. After years
of French counterinsurgency training and under the influence of the US National
Security Doctrine, many Argentine officers were convinced that the acts of organized
resistance were clear signs of a communist takeover (Heinz, 1999: 672–680; Lewis,
2002: 137–143). Precisely along those lines, Jorge Videla, the commander of the army,
justified the seizure of power on the eve of the coup: “The state shows itself incapable of
carrying out its mission [ . . . ], [t]he citizens’ security is seriously threatened [ . . . ], [and
t]he industrial guerrillas are capable of damaging the country’s productive apparatus”
(Andersen, 1993: 170).
While labor unions used strikes to rally against worsening economic and working
conditions, the actual influence of insurgents on nonviolent acts of resistance remains
unclear (Muleiro, 2011: 88–90; Paulón, 2016: 166–185). Nevertheless, many officers
believed that the guerrillas had already disseminated their revolutionary ideas to the
working class and were using strikes to wear down the economic foundation of the state.
“Trade unionists were thought of as domestic sponsors of subversion in league with
international agents of communism” and military hardliners made no distinction
between “Marxist, guerrilla, and legitimate working-class organizations” (Pion-Berlin
and Lopez, 1991: 75). For these officers, Peronist labor unions were “the most dangerous
sectors of society apart from the guerrilla groups,” as the organizations were “infiltrated
by the left and potentially dangerous because they were obvious targets for the
guerrillas” (Heinz, 1999: 668). Influential officers were convinced that only radical
reforms would reinstate law and order (Pion-Berlin and Lopez, 1991: 72–73). With a
Peronist government in place, unwilling or incapable to quell subversion, most officers
became convinced that an intervention in politics was inevitable. Their goal was to
overthrow the government and save the country by eradicating subversion from all parts
of society (Lewis, 2002: 131–137).12
Like the military, the country’s economic elite became increasingly critical of the
government. Entrepreneurs and managers worried that giving in to the unions’ demands
would rupture the Argentine economy and destroy their wealth. Influential factory
owners and families therefore started to support the economic and political plans of the
military (Muleiro, 2011). The alignment between the Argentine establishment and sol-
diers became explicit in 1975, when officers regularly met and discussed political
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matters in circles organized by influential business representatives in the offices of the
director of Citroën, Jaime Perriaux (Muleiro, 2011: 71–75). In these meetings, military
officers and businessmen, such as Argentine Economic Council President Martı́nez de
Hoz, agreed on the “composition and purposes of the future government, among them
the repression of a supposed Marxist infiltration in the unions of its factories and
companies” (O’Donnell, 2012). Business associations sided with the military to “impose
a social, economic, and political reengineering program” (Paulón, 2016: 183). By the
end of 1975, leading officers with strong coup disposition knew that they had the support
of the country’s economic elite. Convinced that the insurgents were gaining momentum
from infiltrated trade unions, on the early morning of 24 March 1976, Argentinians woke
up to the announcement that the military had assumed power.
Venezuela
Since the early 1960s, Venezuela had faced violent resistance from communist insur-
gents. As in Argentina, two insurgent groups used guerrilla tactics to disrupt public life
with the aim of replacing the Betancourt government with a revolutionary leftist regime.
But despite the attempt to demonstrate unity by pooling forces in the Fuerzas Armadas
de Liberación Nacional (FALN), the insurgents failed to mobilize workers in the cities.
For this reason, in 1964, during the first year of the presidency of Raúl Leoni, the rebels
intensified their violence and spread their efforts to more rural areas (Alexander, 1969:
73–94). The government responded by deploying the military and equipped it with great
autonomy to fight insurgents and subversive networks (Trinkunas, 2000: 96–97).
Venezuela’s special forces in charge of the military campaign had received US
counterinsurgency training and held “exceptionally strong [ . . . ] anti-guerrilla feelings”
(Wickham-Crowley, 1992: 66). Given the large-scale and sometimes violent student
protests, military officers were highly concerned about the subversive threat. Assisted
and inspired by the revolution in Cuba, the rebels tried to spread their subversive ideas
and induce desertions among the armed forces (Levine, 1973: 145–176; Wickham-
Crowley, 1992: 88–89).13 From the perspective of many soldiers, the insurgents
wanted to destroy both the government and the military (Irwin, 2000: 5), which fueled
their disposition for a coup.
However, despite being a major strategic goal, the insurgents never gained the support
of the working class and largely failed to mobilize peasants (Alexander, 1969: 107–109;
Wickham-Crowley, 1992: 197). When their calls for strikes did not resonate with the
workers, the insurgents turned to terror attacks, which further reduced their public
support (Callanan, 1969: 53–54). Most labor unions and the vast majority of the rural
population actively supported the democratic parties (Alexander, 1969: 107–113;
Wickham-Crowley, 1992: 197). As one leading insurgent member put it: “[W]e forgot
that in the working class and the peasantry we had no support—there was absolutely no
mass solidarity with the idea of insurrection” (Levine, 1973: 162). Since the interests of
economic elites were not affected, they did not actively lobby for a military takeover.
Other than in the case of Argentina, this allowed the Venezuelan government to
implement an economic program, which included large investments in industries and
infrastructure (Alexander, 1964: 115; Alexander, 1969: 189–190).
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At the same time, the Betancourt government sensibly improved the conditions of the
military. This rapprochement between the executive and the armed forces alleviated
soldiers’ concerns about military cohesion while strengthening their loyalty to demo-
cratic institutions (Alexander, 1964: 106–117). The government achieved that “the great
majority [of soldiers] were at least passively loyal, while a considerable number actually
became enthusiastic about the regime” (Alexander, 1964: 117). Only minor factions
within the armed forces still perceived the necessity to take over political power.
Between 1959 and 1962, revolting soldiers not only lacked the backing by a powerful
societal ally, but the mutineers were also unable to gain the support of the country’s main
garrisons in Caracas and Maracay (Alexander, 1964: 111). In result, revolts were easily
put down by the military factions loyal to the government. The vast majority of the
armed forces was convinced that the government could handle the insurgency without
undermining military interests and that the economic elites would side with the civilian
government in case of a coup (Alexander, 1964: 114). Venezuela’s armed forces
therefore did not concertedly attempt to overthrow the government during the
counterinsurgency.
Quantitative analysis
To test the scope of our argument, we next conduct a quantitative analysis of coup
attempts during all 146 counterinsurgencies between 1950 and 2005. We draw on the
war list by Lyall (2010) as the operational definition closely matches the subversive
context. Lyall (2010: 175) codes conflicts in which insurgents use guerrilla warfare and
subversion to win civilian support and attain their political objectives in an asymmetric,
protracted struggle against the government. We collapse countries fighting multiple
counterinsurgencies in the same year to avoid double counting data points and biased
standard errors. The unit of analysis is the country-year.
Data and method
Our dependent variable is Coup attempts based on Powell and Thyne (2011). The data
offer information on “illegal and overt attempts by the military or other elites within the
state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive” (Powell and Thyne, 2011: 252). The
binary variable takes on the value of 1 for years in which members of the state apparatus
undertook at least one attempt to oust the government, and 0 otherwise.
Our independent variables are based on Banks (2008). Following Casper and Tyson
(2014), we use these data due to their global coverage throughout our observation period.
Other data sources offer more fine-grained information on organized resistance events,
but at the expense of limited temporal or geographical coverage (Clark and Regan, 2018;
Raleigh et al., 2010; Salehyan et al., 2012). Banks (2008) provides information at the
country-year level. In line with previous studies (e.g. Bell and Sudduth, 2017; Powell,
2012), we refrain from lagging our independent variables, as our argument suggests that
resistance events have a direct, contemporaneous effect on coup attempts. Moreover,
lagging presents a poor solution to endogeneity (Bellemare et al., 2017).
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This may raise concerns about temporal ordering and reverse causality. While we
cannot completely rule out that strikes or demonstrations occur in response to military
takeover, we use event data by Clark and Regan (2018) to mitigate these concerns and
assess the magnitude of potential endogeneity problems. If our analysis suffered from
reverse causality, we would expect strikes and demonstrations to occur after a coup
attempt had taken place. Figure 2 depicts the timing of both dissent types 10 weeks
before and after all coup attempts between 1990 and 2017. Strikes clearly increase before
coup attempts but remain low afterwards. We are confident that our results for strikes are
unlikely to suffer from reverse causality. This is different for demonstrations, which
occur in reaction to coup attempts more often. Positive and significant estimates for
demonstrations might therefore stem from reverse causality.
To test our hypotheses, we construct separate variables that code events for each
resistance type: Strikes, Demonstrations, Guerrilla attacks, and Riots. Due to concerns
about reporting biases and to assess the robustness of our results, we use three versions of
each independent variable. First, we employ binary variables indicating country-years in
which the respective resistance event occurred at least once. Second, we use count
variables giving the number of events of each dissent type. Third, we use the natural
logarithm of the count variables to mitigate potential problems with outliers.
Merging data on resistance types with information on insurgencies provides us with a
comprehensive picture of resistance events in internal conflicts. Due to the coding rules
of counterinsurgencies (Lyall, 2010), not all country-years in our data feature events. We
believe that this is a realistic depiction of protracted insurgent campaigns with sporadic
attacks, which also guarantees variation in our independent variables. The absence of
nonviolent and violent events in some years provides us with an empirical counterfactual
in the quantitative analysis.14
We control for variables that are likely to confound the relationship between resis-
tance events and coups. GDPreal growth controls for economic conditions that may
influence social unrest, support by economic elites, and military disposition for coups.
Data are taken from Gleditsch (2002). Troop funding measures military expenditures per



















Figure 2. Temporal order of resistance events and coup attempts.
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soldier and is based on CoW (2010) data. It proxies for the sophistication of military
training and equipment as well as for potential material grievances among soldiers that
might motivate them to rebel. The variable Democracy from Cheibub et al. (2010)
indicates democratic governance. We control for democratic regimes because they
provide institutionalized ways of accommodating public dissent and usually maintain
professional armies.
Distance to capital measures the logged distance between the insurgency and the
capital (Lyall, 2010). It captures the logistical ease with which deployed soldiers can oust
the government as well as political and military dynamics from operations close to the
state’s power center (Bell and Sudduth, 2017; Johnson and Thyne, 2018). We include the
variable Multiple insurgencies, which identifies years in which governments fight
multiple insurgencies as this depletes military resources and provides groups with the
opportunity to organize resistance. Occupation indicates whether the government is a
foreign occupier as this might increase resilience of opposition movements and decrease
military commitment. Finally, we replicate all our statistical models with region fixed
effects to account for idiosyncrasies across different world regions. In the Supporting
Information (SI), we offer additional model specifications with control variables
including the state’s repressive capacity, two full sets of regime types, the cold war
period, and the duration of conflicts to demonstrate the robustness of our results. Our
results hold across all specifications. Summary statistics for all variables are shown in
Table SI.1 in the SI.
As our dependent variable is binary, we employ logistic regression models. All
models include polynomials for the time since the last coup attempt to account for time
dependencies in the dependent variable (Carter and Signorino, 2010). Standard errors are
clustered on the country-level to account for additional country-specific correlations. In
the SI, we show that our main findings also replicate with linear probability models.
Results
Results in Table 1 offer statistical support for the three hypotheses. In line with H1,
strikes are positively and significantly correlated with the risk of coup attempts. The
effect is robust across all specifications and for all measures of strikes. This supports our
argument that soldiers are more likely to attempt coups if they can count on the support
of economic elites eager to end costly work stoppages. Results also offer empirical
evidence for H2. The coefficient estimates for demonstrations are statistically insig-
nificant. Demonstrations may motivate soldiers to intervene in politics but without elite
support this is not sufficient to trigger coups. The results further add to our confidence
that the analyses do not suffer from reverse causality, since potential endogeneity
problems, if anything, should have resulted in a positive and significant estimate for
demonstrations. Finally, in line with H3, guerrilla attacks and riots are statistically
insignificant predictors of coup attempts during counterinsurgencies. The military
considers violent tactics as a regular manifestation of insurgent struggle.
The results for the control variables show that soldiers are less likely to putsch if the
military budget is high and the economy is doing well. Furthermore, democratic gov-
ernments face lower coup risks as these regimes provide institutionalized channels to

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































articulate grievances for both citizens and soldiers. The time polynomials suggest that
temporal proximity to previous coups lowers the risk of a repeated attempt. Given that a
failed coup weakens the state in its struggle against insurgents, coup plotters may refrain
from attempting consecutive takeovers. Finally, location, number, and type of insur-
gencies do not seem to be correlated with wartime coup risk. These results underpin our
argument that it is events within conflicts rather than structural features of insurgencies
that trigger military takeovers.
To gauge the substantive effects, Figure 3 depicts predicted probabilities (King et al.,
2000).15 It shows that strikes substantively raise the probability of a coup attempt in that
year. As the annual number of strikes increases from 0 to 5, the risk that soldiers try to
oust the government increases sixfold, from 6.7% (95% CI: 3.7%–11.0%) to 46.2%
(13.4%–81.3%).16 In contrast, peaceful demonstrations, guerrilla attacks, or riots are not
correlated with a heightened coup risk.
Overall, the results lend support to our hypotheses. In insurgencies, strikes provide
soldiers with the disposition and ability to attempt coups. To soldiers, strikes indicate
that the subversive enemy is gaining ground among the civilian population, which
threatens military interests and the integrity of the state. With the support of economic
elites who are concerned about their business, soldiers attempt to oust the government in
the hopes of effectively suppressing the insurgency and stabilizing the country.
Conditional and selection effects
To corroborate our main findings, we test for conditional and selection effects. Before
we turn to a Heckman regression model, which accounts for non-randomly selected
samples, we first show that our findings also hold if we study the effects of resistance










0 1 2 3 4 5
Number of resistance events
Strikes Guerrilla attacks 95% CI
Demonstrations Riots
Figure 3. Substantive effects of different resistance types on the risk of coup attempts in coun-
terinsurgencies (based on Model 3).
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years from 1950 to 2005 and include interactions between the resistance types and a
dichotomous insurgency variable in the statistical analysis. This enables us to study how
each resistance type influences the risk of coup attempts in peace times and in coun-
terinsurgencies. If our theoretical argument is correct, we should observe that during
insurgencies the effect of strikes on coup attempts is significantly larger than the effect of
any other resistance type. In contrast, during peace times, the effects of all resistance
types should be not significantly different from each other (Casper and Tyson, 2014;
Thyne, 2010; Wig and Rød, 2016). Statistical results are shown in Table SI.9.17 Since
conditional effects should not be directly interpreted in logit models, we calculate
substantive effects (Berry et al., 2010).
Figure 4 shows that the effect of strikes on coup risk is indeed positive and significantly



























During peace: Coup risk
Figure 4. Conditional effects of different resistance types on the risk of coup attempts in
insurgencies and peace times (based on Model 3, Table SI.9).
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confirms the findings from our main analysis. During peace times, by contrast, the effect of
strikes is only marginally significant and statistically indistinguishable from the effect of
all other resistance types. This offers further support for our argument. Labor-based
resistance leads to military takeovers in a context where fears of subversion and eco-
nomic loss create an alliance between military and economic elites for taking over power.
During peace times, where the military does not fear an ongoing subversion, all resistance
types are modestly correlated with a higher coup propensity, which corroborates the
findings of previous studies (Casper and Tyson, 2014; Thyne, 2010; Wig and Rød, 2016).
Next, we additionally model the selection process by which countries transition from
peace to insurgencies. To this end, we employ a two-stage probit model with Heckman




























Stage 2: Coup risk during insurgency
Figure 5. Effects of resistance types on insurgency risk during peace times and on coup risk during
insurgencies using probit models with Heckman sample selection (based on Model 3, Table SI.11).
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second, once an insurgency is ongoing, how the different types of organized resistance
influence the likelihood of coup attempts.18
Figure 5 visualizes substantive results. As we would expect, results of the first stage show
that only genuinely political dissent increases the risk of insurgencies. Guerrilla attacks and
demonstrations are correlated with the occurrence of insurgent uprisings whereas strikes and
riots are not. These findings corroborate the larger point of our theoretical argument that the
political effects of resistance types depend on the context in which they occur. Once an
insurgency is ongoing, strikes are the only resistance type that is substantively and signif-
icantly correlated with coup risk. Together, this lends further support to our theory. Strikes
stir fears of a subversive enemy among the military while generating support by economic
elites, which increases the risk of coup attempts during counterinsurgencies.
Conclusion
Why are acts of organized resistance associated with coups? This article shows that during
counterinsurgencies soldiers are rather unlikely to side with protesters, as they suspect the
insurgent enemy behind public dissent. We argue that strikes increase the risk of coups by
forging an alliance between military and economic elites. Faced with walkouts, both
actors become convinced that the current government needs to be replaced as it is evi-
dently incapable of stabilizing the country and securing the civilian front. We offer
empirical evidence of two case studies from Latin America to trace back the impact of
strikes on the collusion between military and economic elites. In addition, we demonstrate
the scope of our findings with quantitative analyses of coup attempts between 1950 and
2005. Evidence lends strong support to our hypotheses. Strikes are important predictors of
coup attempts during counterinsurgencies, while other types of dissent including
demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla attacks are not correlated with military takeover.
By offering a more nuanced perspective on how civil resistance motivates armed
forces to intervene in politics, this article offers four key implications. First, it shows that
in counterinsurgencies, soldiers and business representatives perceive strikes as an
existential threat, urging them to conspire against both the government and the people in
the streets. This highlights the detrimental effects of nonviolent dissent on post-coup
political orders. Soldiers, driven by fears of subversion, do not stage a coup in solidarity
with demonstrators. Instead, strikes may help radical factions to dominate inner-military
perceptions and facilitate the establishment of a political regime that effectively counters
subversive ideas and protesters. Our results therefore question that coups, triggered by
civil resistance, present an unequivocally good sign for dissidents and citizens.
Second, specifically for labor-based dissent, our study highlights the potential of a
paradoxical backlash effect. By forging an alliance between military and economic
elites, strikes may pave the way for pro-business dictatorships that suppress labor-based
demands and diminish the democratic participation of workers. This result qualifies the
otherwise positive influence of organized labor on peaceful and democratic political
transitions. Our results suggest that in order to assess the risk of backfiring, scholars and
policy-makers may analyze the relations, networks, and cliques within regime elites in
the run-up to a coup. This can help to anticipate the regimes that may emerge after
military takeovers and to avoid overly optimistic hopes for post-coup democratization.
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Third, the findings imply that during revolutions interactions between domestic
protesters and international actors can add “grist to the mill of subversion” and
exacerbate the risk of military coups directed against protesters. International assistance
or the solidarizing with dissidents may feed the suspicion of a subversive, outside
interference among the armed forces and powerful elites. This is likely to fuel fears
among radical military and business factions. Rather than strengthening the protesters’
demands for freedom and democracy, foreign support may therefore induce illegal
power seizures and the creation of authoritarian regimes.
Finally, our findings highlight multiple avenues for future research. We have argued
that the fear of subversion incites soldiers to take over power. Future research may
scrutinize how resistance in other contexts produce similar motivations. For example, in
countries like Egypt, where the armed forces are a major economic player, strikes are
probably sufficient to threaten the soldiers’ vested interests and trigger coups even
without an ongoing counterinsurgency. Similarly, revolutions in allied or neighboring
countries may forge elite-military alliances to undertake preemptive coups in the hope of
immunizing their country against spreading subversive ideas. Moreover, future research
may want to pay closer attention to actors within and outside the military apparatus and
how they moderate coup risk. Competing factions within the armed forces or other
civilian actors such as presidents, parties, and courts may constitute powerful players that
break or expand elite alliances for coups.
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Notes
1. A quarter of all coup attempts occur during insurgencies (Bell and Sudduth, 2017: 1450).
Insurgencies are asymmetric conflicts between militarily inferior rebels and a comparatively
strong state. Between 1950 and 2005, there have been 146 counterinsurgencies across 75
countries (42%), where soldiers were almost twice as likely to intervene in politics.
2. We use the terms “military” and “economic elites” to refer to the dominant faction within
each sector. In the military, this may include soldiers, officers, units, or entire branches with
similar perceptions, beliefs, and preferences (Albrecht, 2019; Scharpf, 2018). In the economic
sector, factions may consist of like-minded managers, firm owners, investors, or business
associations.
3. Casper and Tyson (2014) find that the sum of protests, strikes, and riots increases coup risk;
Wig and Rød (2016) offer evidence on a similar effect for a variable indicating if an election
was followed by protest irrespective of whether it involved violence; Thyne (2010: 453)
shows how instability measured as the “annual count of strikes, riots, assassinations, revolu-
tionary action, purges, anti-government protests, and acts of guerrilla warfare” leads to coups.
For a recent criticism of the lack of conceptual distinction in the existing literature, see Eibl
et al. (2019).
4. Like prior literature, we use “corporate” and “organizational interests” interchangeably. At
the center of military corporate interests is the survival and prosperity of the own organiza-
tion. Military organizations want to maximize their internal cohesion, material endowment,
and public reputation, while they dislike interferences into recruitment, promotions, and
operational decisions (e.g. Finer, 1988; Geddes, 2004; Nordlinger, 1977).
5. Regimes are aware of the potentially devastating consequences of disobedience (e.g. Bellin,
2012; Brooks, 2019). They try to increase loyalty by staffing their key security organizations
with individuals from allied ethnic or sectarian groups (e.g. Harkness, 2016; Hassan, 2017) or
by exploiting soldiers’ career pressures (Scharpf and Gläßel, 2019).
6. We aim at disentangling how the interaction between military and economic elites increase
the risk of coups. We largely omit other actors like political parties, presidents, and courts
from our theoretical discussion as they are more influential for regime transitions and long-
term stability (Mainwaring and Péerez-Liñán, 2013).
7. Our mechanism is military-centered because, under the impression of a subversive insur-
gency, soldiers form radical beliefs about the nature of resistance types and how they should
be counteracted, whereas economic elites’ perceptions should remain unaffected by the sub-
versive threat.
8. During peace times, civil-military relations are typically characterized by a separation
between political and military matters (Feaver, 1999; Huntington, 1985; for a more nuanced
overview, see Talmadge, 2016). While external security threats tend to have stabilizing
effects, internal threats typically alter civil-military relations in favor of the military (Desch,
2008; Piplani and Talmadge, 2016; Stepan, 1986). After terrorist attacks, for example,
“government authorities demand military expertise [ . . . ] and ‘pull’ the military into
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politics,” while officers “exploit their informational advantage over civilian authorities to
‘push’ their way into politics and policymaking” (Bove et al., 2020: 265).
9. Existential threats refer to the military’s key bureaucratic interest to survive as an organi-
zation. This does not contradict the military’s self-image to act as the guardian of the state
since its organizational integrity depends on the integrity of the state.
10. The undermining of the duty of military insubordination began in World War II when parts
of the French military felt obliged to disobey the Vichy regime and instead support the
Resistance. Furthermore, many officers blamed the wavering government for military fail-
ure in Indochina and the nation’s demise (Ambler, 1966: 81–82, 170–192).
11. Our argument rests on the expected rather than actual benefits of a military takeover.
12. Disagreements between military hardliners and moderates concerning the envisaged dura-
tion of military rule emerged only after the coup (Lewis, 2002).
13. See Alexander (1964: 111–112) for detailed accounts of the 1962 revolts at Carúpano and
Puerto Cabello, and the mutineers’ connections to the radical left.
14. Figure SI.1 in the Supporting Information visualizes the distribution of resistance events.
15. Substantive effects are calculated for an autocratic regime fighting one domestic counter-
insurgency with military funding being at the 25th percentile. Other control variables and
time polynomials are held at their median.
16. Figure SI.2 shows the predicted probabilities across the full empirical range of the expla-
natory variables. Substantive findings remain unchanged.
17. O’Donnell (1973, 1988) argues that modernization and economic crises play a crucial role in
the establishment for bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. We replicate the analysis control-
ling for economic development and growth. Results, shown in Table SI.10, remain
unchanged.
18. The first stage resembles the classical model of insurgency onset (Buhaug et al., 2014;
Fearon and Laitin, 2003). See the SI for regression results.
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most recent publications appeared in Comparative Political Studies, Conflict Management and
Peace Science, and the Journal of Peace Research.
Adam Scharpf is a postdoctoral Research Fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area
Studies (GIGA), Germany. He holds a PhD from the University of Mannheim. His research
focuses on authoritarian politics, political violence, and civil-military relations, with a particular
interest in the inner workings of coercive institutions. Scharpf’s research appeared in the American
Journal of Political Science and the Journal of Peace Research, among others.
1060 European Journal of International Relations 26(4)
